The Nostr overlay advert publisher serialized `transport: tor`
endpoints as a bare `<onion>.onion` hostname with no port. The Tor
address parser requires `<host>:<port>` form and rejected the bare
shape with `expected host:port`. Any peer receiving a Tor-only
advert went into a persistent retry-fail loop on jittered backoff
until the advert aged out of the discovery cache. The bug had been
latent for as long as Tor adverts have been published on Nostr, and
was masked in deployments where every node also advertised a
non-Tor transport (peers fell through to the working endpoint).
Surfaced first on a deployment where Tor was the only advert path.
Publisher now emits `<onion>.onion:<port>` using a new
`transports.tor.advertised_port` config field that defaults to 443,
matching the Tor `HiddenServicePort 443 127.0.0.1:<bind_port>`
convention. Operators whose torrc uses a non-default virtual port
can override.
Adds a unit test that pins the publisher/parser contract: formats
the advert exactly as the publisher does and asserts `parse_tor_addr`
accepts the result; asserts the bare-onion form (the bug) does not
parse, catching any future regression that drops the port again.
Parser is unchanged (already correct).
Protocol design specifications for the Federated Interoperable Peering
System — a self-organizing encrypted mesh network built on Nostr identities.
Reading Order
Start with the introduction, then follow the protocol stack from bottom to
top. After the stack, the mesh operation document explains how all the
pieces work together. Supporting references provide deeper dives into
specific topics.
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