Files
fips/testing/tor/directory-mode/docker-compose.yml
Johnathan Corgan 6c90cf6c02 Implement Tor transport with operator visibility
Add TorTransport in src/transport/tor/ supporting three operating modes:

Outbound (socks5 mode):
- Non-blocking SOCKS5 connect via tokio-socks with per-destination
  circuit isolation (IsolateSOCKSAuth)
- TorAddr enum for .onion and clearnet address types
- Connection pool with per-connection receive tasks, reuses TCP
  stream FMP framing
- connect_async()/connection_state_sync()/promote_connection() follow
  the same non-blocking polling pattern as TCP transport

Inbound (directory mode — recommended for production):
- Tor manages the onion service via HiddenServiceDir in torrc
- FIPS reads .onion address from hostname file at startup
- No control port needed — enables Tor Sandbox 1 (seccomp-bpf)
- Accept loop mirrors TCP pattern with DirectoryServiceConfig

Monitoring (control_port mode and optional in directory mode):
- Async control port client supporting TCP and Unix socket connections
  via Box<dyn AsyncRead/Write> trait objects
- AUTHENTICATE with cookie or password auth
- 8 GETINFO queries: bootstrap, circuits, traffic, liveness, version,
  dormant state, SOCKS listeners
- Background monitoring task polls every 10s, caches TorMonitoringInfo
  in Arc<RwLock> for synchronous query access
- Bootstrap milestone logging (25/50/75/100%), stall warning (>60s),
  network liveness transitions, dormant mode entry
- Directory mode optionally connects to control port when control_addr
  is configured (non-fatal on failure)

Operator visibility:
- show_transports query exposes tor_mode, onion_address, tor_monitoring
  (bootstrap, circuit_established, traffic, liveness, version, dormant)
- fipstop transport detail view: Tor mode, onion address, SOCKS5/control
  errors, connection stats, Tor daemon status section
- fipstop table view: tor(mode) label with truncated onion address hint

Security hardening:
- Per-destination circuit isolation via IsolateSOCKSAuth
- Unix socket default for control port (/run/tor/control)
- Reference torrc with HiddenServiceDir, VanguardsLiteEnabled,
  ConnectionPadding, DoS protections (PoW + intro rate limiting)

Config:
- TorConfig with socks5, control_port, and directory modes
- DirectoryServiceConfig: hostname_file, bind_addr
- control_addr, control_auth, cookie_path, connect_timeout,
  max_inbound_connections

Testing:
- 69 unit + integration tests with mock SOCKS5 and control servers
- Docker tests: socks5-outbound (clearnet via Tor) and directory-mode
  (HiddenServiceDir onion service)

Documentation:
- Transport layer design doc: Tor architecture, directory mode
- Configuration doc: Tor config tables and examples
2026-03-15 16:19:54 +00:00

57 lines
1.4 KiB
YAML

# Tor transport integration test — directory mode
#
# Topology:
# [fips-a] — Tor + FIPS co-located, HiddenServiceDir onion service
# [fips-b] — Tor + FIPS co-located, socks5-only, connects to fips-a's .onion
#
# Both nodes run Tor and FIPS in the same container. Node A's Tor manages
# the onion service via HiddenServiceDir with Sandbox 1. Node B connects
# outbound through its local Tor's SOCKS5 proxy.
networks:
dir-test:
driver: bridge
services:
fips-a:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: Dockerfile.colocated
cap_add:
- NET_ADMIN
devices:
- /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun
sysctls:
- net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=0
restart: "no"
container_name: fips-dir-a
hostname: fips-dir-a
volumes:
- ./configs/node-a.yaml:/etc/fips/fips.yaml:ro
environment:
- RUST_LOG=info,fips::transport::tor=debug
networks:
dir-test:
fips-b:
build:
context: .
dockerfile: Dockerfile.colocated
args:
TORRC: torrc.socks5
cap_add:
- NET_ADMIN
devices:
- /dev/net/tun:/dev/net/tun
sysctls:
- net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6=0
restart: "no"
container_name: fips-dir-b
hostname: fips-dir-b
volumes:
- ./configs/node-b.yaml:/etc/fips/fips.yaml:ro
environment:
- RUST_LOG=info,fips::transport::tor=debug
networks:
dir-test: