# Plan: OTP-encrypted Nostr events via n_signer

## Goal

Store encrypted blobs on Nostr (kind `30078` replaceable parameterized events) that are
**information-theoretically secure** — unbreakable by any computer, quantum or classical,
forever — because they are encrypted with a one-time pad (OTP) sourced from the
[`otp`](../otp) project.

A client program sends plaintext (or a ciphertext) to `n_signer` over its existing
JSON-RPC transport. `n_signer` performs the OTP XOR against pad material it reads from a
USB drive, advances the per-pad offset, and returns the ciphertext (or plaintext). The
caller then wraps the result in a Nostr `30078` event and signs/publishes it via the
existing `sign_event` verb.

Both output encodings are supported, matching the standalone `otp` tool:

- **ASCII armored** (`-----BEGIN OTP MESSAGE-----` + base64): text-safe, for embedding
  directly in Nostr event `content` (kind `30078`).
- **Binary** (`.otp` structured header + raw encrypted bytes): for uploading to Blossom
  servers as a blob and referencing from a Nostr event by SHA-256 hash. The caller
  receives the binary blob base64-encoded in the JSON-RPC response and decodes it
  before uploading.

For testing, pad material can be generated from local entropy (`/dev/urandom` or
keyboard entropy) using the `otp` tool. The eventual production target is a USB drive
holding the pad, accessed by `n_signer` at runtime. A future microcontroller hardware
signer that carries the pad onboard is explicitly out of scope for this plan and is
tracked separately.

## Design summary

- `n_signer` gains two new verbs: `otp_encrypt` and `otp_decrypt`.
- Pad material lives on a USB drive (file path supplied at startup). `n_signer` reads
  only the slice it needs, XORs in `mlock`'d RAM, and writes the new offset back to the
  pad's `.state` file on the USB drive.
- The pad is **not** loaded whole into RAM; it is seeked-and-read per request. This
  preserves the spirit of the zero-filesystem-footprint model (no pad material is ever
  copied onto the host disk; the only on-disk artifact is the offset counter on the USB
  drive itself, which is required for multi-device coordination).
- The encrypted payload is returned in either ASCII-armored or binary `.otp` format,
  selected per request via an `encoding` option. ASCII armor is base64-safe for JSON
  and Nostr event `content`; binary `.otp` is for Blossom blob uploads.
- The caller is responsible for building and publishing the `30078` event; `n_signer`
  only does the OTP transform and (separately) signs the event when asked.

```mermaid
flowchart LR
  Client[Client program] -->|otp_encrypt JSON-RPC| NS[n_signer]
  NS -->|seek + read slice| USB[USB pad file .pad]
  NS -->|read/advance offset| State[USB .state file]
  NS -->|XOR in mlock RAM| CT[Ciphertext blob]
  NS -->|return ascii-armored| Client
  Client -->|wrap in 30078 event| Event[Nostr event JSON]
  Client -->|sign_event| NS
  NS -->|schnorr sig| Client
  Client -->|publish| Relay[Nostr relay]
```

## Architecture decisions

### 1. New verbs, not a new transport

OTP operations are just new verbs on the existing dispatcher
([`src/dispatcher.c`](src/dispatcher.c:1)). They use the same framed JSON-RPC,
policy, approval, and enforcement machinery as `sign_event` / `nip44_encrypt`. No new
transport is needed.

### 2. Pad storage on USB, not in mnemonic RAM

The OTP pad is far too large to live in `mlock`'d RAM (gigabytes) and is not
mnemonic-derived. It lives on a USB drive mounted at a path `n_signer` is told at
startup via a new `--otp-pad-dir <path>` flag. `n_signer` opens the pad file
read-only, seeks to the current offset, reads exactly `chunk_size` bytes (after
Padmé padding), XORs against the (padded) plaintext in a small `mlock`'d scratch
buffer, and writes the advanced offset back to `<chksum>.state` on the USB drive.

This is a deliberate, narrow exception to the "zero filesystem footprint" rule: the
only filesystem artifact `n_signer` touches is the offset counter on the USB drive
itself, which is mandatory for pad-reuse avoidance across devices. No pad bytes and
no plaintext ever touch the host disk.

### 2a. Qubes OS USB access strategy

On Qubes, the signer qube must have sole access to the pad-bearing USB drive. The
chosen strategy is **PCI USB controller passthrough** (Option A): an entire USB
controller is assigned to the signer qube via `qvm-pci attach`, so dom0, `sys-usb`,
and every other qube are blind to the pad device. The drive appears as a normal
`/dev/sd*` inside the signer qube.

Fallback if no spare controller is available: **`qvm-block attach` from `sys-usb`**
(Option B), accepting that `sys-usb` briefly enumerates the device and block I/O
transits dom0's blkback (a traffic-analysis concern, not a plaintext-leak concern
since pad bytes stay encrypted-on-disk).

Code-level guard (Option D): `n_signer` refuses to open `--otp-pad-dir` unless the
underlying device is a directly-owned PCI device (`/dev/sd*` from a passthrough
controller) when running under Qubes; blkback devices (`/dev/xvdi`) are rejected
unless `--otp-allow-blkback` is explicitly passed. This makes "sole access" a
code-level invariant, not just an operator convention.

Offset writes use atomic write-temp-then-rename so a crash mid-write cannot corrupt
the `.state` file. The offset is advanced **only after** the XOR succeeds and the
ciphertext is handed back to the caller.

### 3. Reuse the `otp` project's file formats and padding

- Pad file format: `<chksum>.pad` raw random bytes, with a 32-byte header reserved
  (matches [`../otp/src/pads.c`](../otp/src/pads.c:1) `offset=32` initial reservation).
- State file format: `<chksum>.state` containing `offset=<n>\n` (matches
  [`../otp/src/pads.c:284`](../otp/src/pads.c:284) `read_state_offset`).
- ASCII armor format: `-----BEGIN OTP MESSAGE-----` with `Pad-ChkSum` and
  `Pad-Offset` headers (matches [`../otp/src/crypto.c`](../otp/src/crypto.c:1)
  `parse_ascii_message` / `generate_ascii_armor`).
- Padding: exponential bucketing + ISO/IEC 9797-1 Method 2 (Padmé) from
  [`../otp/src/padding.c`](../otp/src/padding.c:1).

This means pads generated by the standalone `otp` CLI are bit-compatible with pads
consumed by `n_signer`, and ciphertexts produced by either tool are interchangeable.

### 4. Code sharing strategy

Rather than vendoring a copy of the `otp` source into `n_signer`, extract the
format-critical functions into a small shared static library `libotppad` that both
projects link against. Candidates to extract:

- `universal_xor_operation` ([`../otp/src/crypto.c:35`](../otp/src/crypto.c:35))
- `parse_ascii_message` / `generate_ascii_armor`
- `calculate_chunk_size` / `apply_padme_padding` / `remove_padme_padding`
  ([`../otp/src/padding.c`](../otp/src/padding.c:1))
- `read_state_offset` / `write_state_offset`
  ([`../otp/src/pads.c:284`](../otp/src/pads.c:284))
- `calculate_checksum` (pad identification)

`n_signer` then only needs to implement: USB pad directory config, the two new
dispatcher verbs, the seek-read-XOR-write-offset loop, and approval/policy wiring.

### 5. Nostr event shape (kind 30078)

The caller builds the event; `n_signer` does not. Two payload patterns:

**A. ASCII armor in event content** (text-safe, self-contained):

```json
{
  "kind": 30078,
  "content": "-----BEGIN OTP MESSAGE-----\nVersion: v0.3.53\nPad-ChkSum: <64hex>\nPad-Offset: <n>\n\n<base64>\n-----END OTP MESSAGE-----",
  "tags": [
    ["d", "<caller-chosen-d-tag>"],
    ["otp-pad", "<16-char chksum prefix>"],
    ["otp-version", "v0.3.53"],
    ["otp-encoding", "ascii"]
  ],
  ...
}
```

**B. Binary `.otp` uploaded to Blossom, referenced by hash** (for binaries/large blobs):

```json
{
  "kind": 30078,
  "content": "",
  "tags": [
    ["d", "<caller-chosen-d-tag>"],
    ["otp-pad", "<16-char chksum prefix>"],
    ["otp-version", "v0.3.53"],
    ["otp-encoding", "binary"],
    ["blob", "<sha256-hex>", "<mimetype>", "<size-bytes>"],
    ["url", "<blossom-url>"]
  ],
  ...
}
```

In both cases the `Pad-Offset` (in the ASCII armor header, or in the binary `.otp`
file header) is what a decrypting device uses to seek into its copy of the same pad.
The `otp-pad` tag lets a reader find the right pad without parsing the payload first.
The `otp-encoding` tag tells the reader whether to look in `content` or follow the
`blob`/`url` tags to Blossom.

### 6. Multi-device offset coordination (deferred)

Out of scope for v1. The `.state` file on the device's USB drive is the local source
of truth for how far that device has consumed the pad, and the `Pad-Offset` header
in each ciphertext's ASCII armor / binary header records which slice was used. That
is sufficient for single-device operation.

If multi-device pad sharing is added later (two devices holding copies of the same
`.pad`), a dedicated signed coordination event would be needed so devices never
reuse a slice. That event does not have to be kind `30078` and is not designed here.
Note: kind `30078` is a Nostr application-data convention, not part of the OTP spec —
the `otp` project has no Nostr code today.

## Phased implementation

### Phase 0 — Test pad on the USB drive ✅ Done

- [x] Created `pads/` directory on the mounted USB drive.
- [x] Generated a 1 MB test pad from `/dev/urandom` with a 32-byte reserved header,
      using [`tools/make_test_pad.c`](tools/make_test_pad.c:1).
- [x] Computed the pad's 256-bit XOR checksum (matching the `otp` project's
      [`../otp/src/crypto.c:242`](../otp/src/crypto.c:242) `calculate_checksum`
      algorithm) and named the pad file by that checksum.
- [x] Wrote the initial `.state` file (`offset=32\n`).
- [x] Verified the checksum matches the filename via an independent re-computation.

**Actual test pad on this qube:**

| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| USB drive | SanDisk 3.2 Gen1, 466 GB, `/dev/sda1` |
| Mount point | `/media/user/Music` (FAT32, label "Music") |
| Pad directory | `/media/user/Music/pads` |
| Pad file | `333e9902db839d9d7f1f6aaa30f392a77c9abd011dd6274d9d3cf167361a789e.pad` |
| State file | `333e9902db839d9d7f1f6aaa30f392a77c9abd011dd6274d9d3cf167361a789e.state` |
| Size | 1,048,576 bytes (1 MB) |
| Chksum prefix | `333e9902db839d9d` |
| Initial offset | 32 (header reserved) |

Note: the drive is currently mounted at `/media/user/Music` (its FAT32 label is
"Music"), not at `/media/user/USBDISK`. For `n_signer` testing, pass
`--otp-pad-dir /media/user/Music/pads`. This pad is for local-entropy testing only;
production pads will be generated with the `otp` CLI (keyboard/TRNG entropy) or a
future hardware signer.

### Phase 1 — Shared `libotppad` extraction

- [ ] Create `libotppad/` directory with the format-critical functions extracted from
      [`../otp/src/crypto.c`](../otp/src/crypto.c:1), [`../otp/src/padding.c`](../otp/src/padding.c:1),
      and [`../otp/src/pads.c`](../otp/src/pads.c:1).
- [ ] Add a `libotppad.h` public header declaring: `universal_xor_operation`,
      `parse_ascii_message`, `generate_ascii_armor`, `calculate_chunk_size`,
      `apply_padme_padding`, `remove_padme_padding`, `read_state_offset`,
      `write_state_offset`, `calculate_checksum`.
- [ ] Refactor the `otp` project to link against `libotppad` instead of its own copies.
- [ ] Add unit tests for `libotppad` (round-trip encrypt/decrypt, padding edge cases,
      state file read/write).

### Phase 2 — `n_signer` USB pad directory support

- [ ] Add `--otp-pad-dir <path>` CLI flag to [`src/main.c`](src/main.c:1); store the
      path in a new `otp_pad_state_t` alongside the existing mnemonic/role state.
- [ ] Add a `--otp-pad <chksum-or-prefix>` flag (or interactive selector) to pick
      **the single pad** that is active for this session. One pad per session — the
      pad is bound at startup and cannot be switched without restarting `n_signer`.
- [ ] Implement `otp_pad_open(chksum)` / `otp_pad_read_slice(offset, len)` /
      `otp_pad_advance_offset(delta)` helpers in a new `src/otp_pad.c`.
- [ ] Validate the pad's checksum matches the requested chksum before first use.
- [ ] Refuse to operate if the pad directory is on the same filesystem as `/` (require
      it to be a removable mount — best-effort check via `statvfs`).

### Phase 3 — `otp_encrypt` / `otp_decrypt` verbs

- [ ] Add `VERB_OTP_ENCRYPT "otp_encrypt"` and `VERB_OTP_DECRYPT "otp_decrypt"` to
      [`src/dispatcher.c`](src/dispatcher.c:1).
- [ ] Request shapes (plaintext is base64 in the JSON param for both text and
      binary; the pad is the one bound at startup, so no `pad` field is needed):
  ```json
  { "id": "1", "method": "otp_encrypt",
    "params": [ "<plaintext-base64>", { "encoding": "ascii|binary" } ] }
  ```
  ```json
  { "id": "2", "method": "otp_decrypt",
    "params": [ "<ciphertext-ascii-armor-or-base64-otp-blob>", { "encoding": "ascii|binary" } ] }
  ```
- [ ] `otp_encrypt` flow: padmé-pad plaintext → seek to offset → read slice → XOR in
      `mlock`'d scratch → advance offset → return ciphertext in requested encoding
      (`ascii` → ASCII-armored string, `binary` → base64-encoded `.otp` blob in the
      JSON result).
- [ ] `otp_decrypt` flow: accept either ASCII armor or base64-encoded binary `.otp`
      blob → parse header → seek to `Pad-Offset` → read slice → XOR in `mlock`'d
      scratch → strip padding → return plaintext (in requested encoding).
- [ ] Add an `encoding` option to both verbs: `"encoding": "ascii"` (default) or
      `"encoding": "binary"`. For `otp_encrypt`, controls output format. For
      `otp_decrypt`, tells the signer what format the input is in (auto-detection by
      magic bytes `OTP\0` is a fallback).
- [ ] Wire both verbs into the policy/enforcement table
      ([`src/policy.c`](src/policy.c:1), [`src/enforcement.c`](src/enforcement.c:1))
      with **per-session grant** approval: the first `otp_encrypt` / `otp_decrypt`
      call for the session prompts the user; once granted, subsequent calls on the
      same pad in the same session do not re-prompt. This matches the `[a] always
      allow this session` hotkey behavior already in [`README.md`](README.md:1).
- [ ] Add approval-prompt display fields: pad chksum prefix, offset before/after,
      plaintext length bucket.

### Phase 4 — Local-entropy test path

- [ ] Document the test workflow: generate a small pad with the `otp` CLI
      (`./otp generate 1MB`) into a directory, point `n_signer` at it with
      `--otp-pad-dir`, run `otp_encrypt` round-trips from a client.
- [ ] Add an integration test in [`tests/test_integration.c`](tests/test_integration.c:1)
      that: starts `n_signer` with a temp pad dir, calls `otp_encrypt` then
      `otp_decrypt`, asserts round-trip equality, and asserts the offset advanced by
      the padded chunk size.
- [ ] Add a test that confirms a ciphertext produced by `n_signer` can be decrypted by
      the standalone `otp` CLI (cross-compatibility).

### Phase 5 — Nostr 30078 client example

- [ ] Add `examples/otp_nostr_30078.c` showing: call `otp_encrypt` → build a kind 30078
      event with the ASCII armor as `content` → call `sign_event` → print the signed
      event for publishing.
- [ ] Add a matching `examples/otp_nostr_30078_decrypt.c` showing: fetch a 30078 event
      → call `otp_decrypt` with its `content` → print recovered plaintext.
- [ ] Document the workflow in [`documents/`](documents/) and link from
      [`README.md`](README.md:1).

### Phase 6 (deferred) — USB-bound pad hardening

- [ ] Detect removable-mount requirement more strictly (udev properties).
- [ ] Optional: read-only mount enforcement, pad integrity re-check on each request.
- [ ] Optional: per-pad `mlock`'d offset cache so a crash mid-request does not corrupt
      the `.state` file (write-offset-after-success-only is already the plan).

### Phase 7 (explicitly deferred) — Microcontroller hardware signer with onboard pad

Tracked separately. When it lands, the `--otp-pad-dir` path is replaced by a transport
call (serial/WebUSB) to a pad-serving firmware, and the verbs stay identical.

## Decisions

1. **Plaintext encoding in `otp_encrypt` params.** Accept base64 in the JSON param
   for both text and binary plaintext; the signer decodes it. Output encoding is the
   `ascii` vs `binary` option described above.
2. **One pad per session.** The pad is bound at `n_signer` startup via
   `--otp-pad-dir` + `--otp-pad` and cannot be switched without restarting the
   signer. Simpler and safer for v1.
3. **No pad-heartbeat event in v1.** The `.state` file on the USB drive is the local
   source of truth; the `Pad-Offset` header in each ciphertext records the slice
   used. Multi-device pad sharing and any coordination event are deferred. (Kind
   `30078` is a Nostr application-data convention, not part of the OTP spec.)
4. **Per-session grant approval.** The first `otp_encrypt` / `otp_decrypt` call in a
   session prompts the user; once granted, subsequent calls on the same pad do not
   re-prompt. Matches the existing `[a] always allow this session` behavior.
5. **Qubes USB strategy.** PCI USB controller passthrough (Option A) is the target;
   `qvm-block` from `sys-usb` (Option B) is the fallback. For development/testing,
   the USB drive is already accessible in this qube at `/media/user/Music` (see
   Phase 0). Code-level guard (Option D) rejects blkback devices unless
   `--otp-allow-blkback` is passed.
