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bloom: raise max_inbound_fpr antipoison cap from 0.05 to 0.10
The inbound FilterAnnounce FPR cap rejects filters whose false-positive rate (fill^k) exceeds the configured maximum. On the fixed 1 KB / k=5 filter, 0.05 corresponds to fill 0.549 (~1,300 reachable entries), and the busiest nodes' aggregates were beginning to hit that ceiling as the mesh grew. Raise the default to 0.10 (fill 0.631, ~1,630 entries) to restore headroom toward the fixed-filter capacity limit. A saturated or poisoned filter is ~100% FPR and remains rejected, so the antipoison gate is not materially weakened. Updates the config default, the config-reference and bloom-filter design docs, and the changelog.
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@@ -32,6 +32,14 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
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### Changed
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- `node.bloom.max_inbound_fpr` default raised from `0.05` to `0.10`. The
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cap rejects inbound `FilterAnnounce` whose FPR (`fill^k`) exceeds it. On
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the fixed 1 KB / k=5 filter, `0.05` corresponds to fill 0.549 (~1,300
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reachable entries) and had begun rejecting the busiest nodes' aggregates
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as the mesh approached that size. `0.10` (fill 0.631, ~1,630 entries)
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restores headroom toward the fixed-filter capacity limit without
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materially weakening the antipoison gate: a saturated or poisoned filter
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is ~100% FPR and still rejected.
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- Sidecar example (`examples/sidecar-nostr-relay`): `udp.mtu` is now
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overridable via the `FIPS_UDP_MTU` environment variable, defaulting to
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1472 (preserving prior behavior). Plumbed through `docker-compose.yml`
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@@ -350,14 +350,14 @@ exposed through the control socket and `fipstop` dashboard.
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The estimator refuses to produce a value when any contributing filter
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is above the antipoison FPR cap (`node.bloom.max_inbound_fpr`,
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default `0.05`); a partial aggregate would silently underestimate.
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default `0.10`); a partial aggregate would silently underestimate.
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Consumers handle the resulting `None` by displaying an "unknown"
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state rather than a misleading number.
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## Antipoison: Inbound FPR Cap
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Inbound `FilterAnnounce` payloads are checked against
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`node.bloom.max_inbound_fpr` (default `0.05`). Filters whose
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`node.bloom.max_inbound_fpr` (default `0.10`). Filters whose
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estimated false positive rate exceeds the cap are dropped silently
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(no NACK on the wire) — they would otherwise inflate downstream
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candidate evaluation cost without contributing useful discrimination.
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@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ Controls tree construction and parent selection.
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| Parameter | Type | Default | Description |
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|-----------|------|---------|-------------|
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| `node.bloom.update_debounce_ms` | u64 | `500` | Debounce interval for filter update propagation |
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| `node.bloom.max_inbound_fpr` | f64 | `0.05` | Antipoison cap: reject inbound `FilterAnnounce` frames whose advertised false-positive rate exceeds this value. Valid range `(0.0, 1.0)`. The default `0.05` corresponds to fill 0.549 at k=5 (≈3,200 entries on the 1 KB filter) |
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| `node.bloom.max_inbound_fpr` | f64 | `0.10` | Antipoison cap: reject inbound `FilterAnnounce` frames whose advertised false-positive rate exceeds this value. Valid range `(0.0, 1.0)`. The default `0.10` corresponds to fill 0.631 at k=5 (≈1,630 entries on the 1 KB filter); a saturated/poisoned filter is still ~100% FPR and rejected |
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Bloom filter size (1 KB), hash count (5), and size classes are protocol
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constants and not configurable.
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@@ -899,7 +899,7 @@ node:
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flap_dampening_secs: 120 # extended hold-down on flap
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bloom:
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update_debounce_ms: 500
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max_inbound_fpr: 0.05 # antipoison cap on inbound FilterAnnounce FPR
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max_inbound_fpr: 0.10 # antipoison cap on inbound FilterAnnounce FPR
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session:
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default_ttl: 64
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pending_packets_per_dest: 16
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@@ -625,9 +625,12 @@ pub struct BloomConfig {
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pub update_debounce_ms: u64,
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/// Antipoison cap: reject inbound FilterAnnounce whose FPR exceeds
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/// this value (`node.bloom.max_inbound_fpr`). Valid range `(0.0, 1.0)`.
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/// Default `0.05` ≈ fill 0.549 at k=5 ≈ ~3,200 entries on the 1KB
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/// filter. Conceptually distinct from future autoscaling hysteresis
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/// setpoints — same unit, different knobs.
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/// Default `0.10` ≈ fill 0.631 at k=5 ≈ ~1,630 entries on the 1 KB
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/// filter (Swamidass–Baldi). Raised from 0.05 so aggregates that are
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/// legitimately near their operating ceiling are not rejected before
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/// the network reaches the fixed-filter capacity limit; conceptually
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/// distinct from future autoscaling hysteresis setpoints — same unit,
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/// different knobs.
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#[serde(default = "BloomConfig::default_max_inbound_fpr")]
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pub max_inbound_fpr: f64,
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}
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@@ -636,7 +639,7 @@ impl Default for BloomConfig {
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fn default() -> Self {
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Self {
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update_debounce_ms: 500,
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max_inbound_fpr: 0.05,
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max_inbound_fpr: 0.10,
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}
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}
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}
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@@ -646,7 +649,7 @@ impl BloomConfig {
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500
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}
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fn default_max_inbound_fpr() -> f64 {
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0.05
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0.10
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}
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}
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